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At present there exist at least thre.;l different structural models for the 
early medievallndian kingdoms of the post-Gupta and pre-Delhi Sultanate 
period (c. 550-1200 A.o.) 
(i) The "conventional model" of a rather unitary, centrally organized 
kin~dom with a strong central bureaucracy; 
(ii) the Marxist-influenced "Indian feudalism model" of decentralized 
feudal states ( which, however. presupposes the existence of an 
earlier rather strong central state which had been weakened thro-
ugh f eudalization of the society); and 
(iii) the model of a "segmentary state" which allots the Hindu 
kingdom a position on a continuum of governance formation 
between the tribal "stateless" form of government and the unitary 
state. 
These three models depict the early medieval Indian kingdom either 
(i) as a strong and centralized state or (Ii) as a kingdom which was a 
weak and decentralized successor to an earlier strong and centralized 
state or (iii) as a state which had not yet reached the position of a strong 
and centralized state though it did have some of its characteristics in its 
coro around the capital. The first model thus places the Hindu kingdom 
in the final position of the continuum of pre-modern state formation, 
wherea's the second and third models fix its position far below it. The 
last two, however, differ completely in the explanation of how the Hindu 
kingdom arrived at this position. Accordmg to the conception of "In-
dian feudalism", state formation after the Gupta period had a decidedly 
negative character, since the many local kingdoms and principalities 
had developed at the cost of former larger political entities. In 
opposition to this explanation, the concept of segmentary state assumes 
•1 wish to express my than.cs to A. Hofer, G . D . Sontheimer and E. Lenck of the 
South-Asia Institute for their comments. 
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that the Hindu kingdom had developed "from below" up to a certain 
level which, because of inherent structural problems, it was unable to 
transcend in its further development towards a unitary state. 
Before trying to show that the historical development of several Indian 
regions like Orissa might provide yet another variant of state formation, 
we should have a closer look at these conceptions as a kind of introduc-
tion to the following delineations. 
The conventional interpretation of India's early medieval past, parti· 
cularly by Indian historians, had been influenced by the struggle for 
independence. Against the obvious neglect of this period by British his-
torians-e.g. V.A. Smith's Oxford History devot<!d nearly the same 
number of pages to Alexander in India as to the 600 years of North 
Indian history after Har~a. and the respective second volume of the 
Cambridge History of India was never published-it had to be shown 
that the "dark period" in many respects was actually a continuation of 
the Golden Ag~. Though much has also been written on the theory of 
the state, kingshiP. and administration, little analytical work was devoted 
to the actual structure of the late ancient and early medieval kingdoms. 
The early historians had usually identified structure with administration 
and its analysis with a detailed description of the app:uent hierarchically 
organized levels of administration. From their mention in the inscriptions 
their e,:istence in the whole kingdom even in its outer provinces was 
inferred, though their continuous and actual existence was not always 
established even for the core of the kingdoms. Problems like the conti-
nuou~ ~rowth and decline of various kingdoms were considered questions 
of mere military conquest rather than of structural peculiarities.1 It was 
only in the fifties that a considerable change took place in the research 
on the late classical and early medieval states of India. The concept of 
dynastic history, which so far bad dominated modern historiography, 
was supplemented by more analytical and less descriptive work, particu-
larly in the field of socio-economic:aspects of certain periods of North-
Indian history. An important impetus came from Professor A.L. Basham 
and a group of young Indian scholars at London University who pro-
duced a series of excellent theses, several of which have meanwhile 
become standard works in their respective fields.• 
1For the relevant literature see chapter XIII of H. Kulke, H. Leue, J. Lutt and 
D. Rothermund, "lndische Geschichte Alter/um bis zur Gegenwart Llteraturbericht 
uber ne11ne Verof!entlichungen, which is published as a separate issue of the Histori-
sche Zeitschrift, 1980. 
'Examples arc : G .L. Adhya, Early Indian Economics (Studies in the Economic 
Life of Northern and Western India, c. 200 B.C-300 A. D.), Delhi, 1966; S.K. 
Maity, Economic Life of North India in the Gupta Period (cir. 300-SSO), Jst. ed. 
1957, 2nd ed. Delhi, 1970, L. Gopal, Tlte Economic Life of Nortltern India, c. A.D. 
700-1200, Delhi, 1965. 
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II 
A further decisive step in the historiography of independent India took 
place with the introduction of the concept offeudalism into Indian history. 
In the year 1956, Daniel Thorner rightly began his contribution on 
India to a comparative study on" Feudalism in History" with the remark: 
"There is no single work solely devoted to feudalism in India; nor is 
there even a single article on the place of feudalism in the historical 
evolution of India" .3 Basing his study only on the Raj put and Muslim 
states, he concluded "that neither the Rajput nor the Muslim regimes 
was feudal". 
It is not without a touch of irony that exactly in the same year 1956 
D.D. Kosambi published two articles on the development of feudalism 
in India and the origin of feudalism in Kashmir.' And only two years 
later R.S. Sharma began to contribute a series of articles to various 
journals on the origin and development of feudalism in lndia.5 Together 
with several new articles, they were republished in 1965 in his monograph 
on "Indian Feudalism", which though not uncriticized, became the stan-
dard work on Indian feudalism until now.8 More recently he published 
several other articles in which he summarized his research, highlighting 
several important aspects of his theory.7 , 
During the last 15 years Sharma's theory was followed by a rather 
large group of North Indian historians who contributed various articles 
and quite a few monographs, particularly noteworthy among them being 
B.N.S.. Yadava's comprehensive study on the Society and Culture in 
Northern India in the Twelfth Century.8 They enlarged considerably the 
available material for a comparative study of Indian feudalism, but only 
a few of them contributed to a more theoretical discussion of its con-
ceptual frafoework. A general insight into the discussions among this 
"Indian Feudalism School" is given in the two publications Historical 
•Daniel Thorner, "Feudalism in India", in Feudalism in History, R. Coulbom, 
ed. Princeton, 1956 p. 133-150. 
'D.D. Kosambi, "On the Development of Feudalism in India", in Annals of the 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, XXXVI, 1956, pp. 258-369; "Origins of 
Feudalism in Kashmir", in J. of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (The 
Sardh.JSatapdi Commemoration Volume, 1804-1954), 1956-57, pp. 108-20. 
'R. S. Sharma, "The Origins of Feudalism in India (c.A.D. 400-650)", in J. of 
the Economic and Social History of the Orient, I, 1958, pp. 297-328. 
•R.S. Sharma, lndian Feudalism: c. 300-1200, Calcutta, 1965. 
7R.S. Sharma, Methods and Problems of the Study of Feudalism in Early Medie-
val India", in Indian Economic Review, I, 1974 pp. 1-10; "Indian Feudalism 
Retouched", in Indian Historical Review, I, 2, 1974, pp. 320-30. 
•B.N.S. Yadava, Society and Culture in North India in the 12th Century, Allahabad, 
1973; see also D. N. Jha, Revenue System in Post-Maurya and Gupta Times, Calcutta, 
1967. 
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Probings in Memory of D. D. Kosambi 9 and the first volume of the Indian 
Historical Review (1974) , both edited by R.S. Sharma and V. Jha and 
published by the Indian Council of Historical Research. 
According to R.S. Sharma the origin of Indian feudalism has to be 
sought in the ever-increasing number of land grants to Brahmins and 
religious institutions since the early centuries A.O. and later, also to 
various government officials. Their endowment with more and more 
immunities (e.g. freedom from taxation and inspection by royal officers 
etc.) and royal prerogatives (e.g, jurisdiction and collection of fines etc.) 
led to the creation of a class of landed intermediaries which alienated 
land and people from the central dynasty and deprived the villagers of 
traditional rights . The loss of coercive control over land ·and people was 
further aggravated by the decline of urbanism and interregional trade 
and the scarcity of coins. Politically the development was characterized 
by a continuous process of fragmentation and decentralisation, caused 
"by the widespread practice of granting big and small territories to vas-
sals and officials who entrenched themselves territorially and ended up 
as independent potentates" .10 
The conception of Indian feudalism raised a vehement controversy 
even before R. S. Sharma's book was published. In a special 
seminar held in December 1964 at the Centre of Advanced 
Study in Ancient Indian History and Culture at the University of 
Calcutta several lectures were delivered supporting or criticizing the 
.- conception. D. C . Sircar concluded his lecture on "Landlordism 
confused with Feudalism" with the remark : "Feudalism is thus a 
misnomer in the early Indian context".11 His main argument against the 
application of the concept of feudalism to Indian history is the undeni-
able scarcity of inscriptions granting service tenure against the over-
whelming majority of land grants to Brahmins and religious institutions. 
According to Sircar "the majority of the numerous charters discovered 
all over the country Ncord grants of land to gods and Brahmanas 
without stipulating any obligation of the donees to the donors. 
Obviously, the priestly class was the most unsuitable for rendering 
services of the feudal type" .12 In a formal sense, in the narrow context of 
early European feudalism, this argument is certainly correct but, as 
9R.S. Sharma and V. Jha (cdi.), Indian Society: Historical ProbillfS in Memory 
of D. D. Kosambi, New Delhi, 1974, 2nd ed., 1977. For a very helpful general survey 
sec also D . Rothcrmund, "Feudalism in India," in Ths Phases of Indian Nationalism 
and other Essays, by D. Rothcrmund, Bombay, 1970, pp. 165-78. 
10R.S. Sharma, Indian Feudalism : c. 300-1200, op. cit. p. 159. 
11D.C. Si rear, Land System and Feudalism In Ancient India, University of Calcutta, 
1966, pp. 57-62. The article was republished as "Indian Landlordism and European 
Feudalism", in: D.C. Sircar, Studies in the Political and Administrative Sy1t,ms fn 
Ancient and Medieval India , Delhi, 1944, pp. 13-32. It was reviewed again by R.S. 
Sharma in his review article "Indian Feudalism Retouched", op. cit. 
110 .C. Sircar, op. cit ., p. 56. 
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shall be pointed out later on, it may miss an important point when 
applied to the period of early medieval Hindu kingdoms, when 
Brahmins did play a most important role in the process of early state 
formation. 
Very recently the "Indian Feudalism School" itself seems to have 
entered the discussion on the validity of the existing conceptual frame-
work of Indian feudalism. In their respective presidential Addresses at 
the Waltair Session of the Indian History Congress in December 1979 
D. N. Jha and Harbans Mukhia raised several interesting questions 
concerning the applicability of the concept of feudalism in the Indian. 
context.13 In bis address to the Ancient India Section, Jha supports the 
concept of Indian feudalism but he points out that ''there has been in 
the past few years some realisation of the theoretical weakness of the 
explanation of feudal developments only in terms of foreign trade, 
whose decline, to a large extent, depended on factors external to the 
Indian situation . . . . It is this theoretical impasse which has recently 
led to a rethinking on the part of the exponents of the Indian feudal 
model from the vantage point of the international social contradictions." 
Jha enlarges therefore on the concept of the Kaliyuga which according 
to him indicates a sharp class antagonism in ancient Indian society. 
This antagonism led to the establishment of the feudal order as, later on 
the social crisis and the resurgence of trade and urbanism around 1000 
A.D. caused the weakening of the feudal order in India. Incidentally, 
it is interesting that Jha rightly observes that "the areas where the land 
grant economy first made its appearance were on the periphery of the 
regions with firmly entrenched brahmanical order and had thus nothing 
to do with the social crisis and decadence reflected in the idea of 
Kaliyuga." Jha thus questions one of the main props of R.S. Sharma's 
explanation of the origin of Indian feudalism. 
Whereas, generally speaking, D. N. Jha tries to conciliate the concept 
of Indian feudalism even more, as formerly done by R.S . Sharma, with 
the Marxist concept of feudalism, Harbans Mukhia raises very critical 
questions against the very existence of feudalism in India. After a more 
thorough delineation on the concepts of European feudalism as derived 
by European medievalis~s, he points out that "European feudalism 
developed essentially as changes at the base of the society took place: 
in India, on the other hand, the establishment of feudalism is attributed 
by its protagonists primarily tc ,tate action in granting land in lieu of 
salary or in charity, and the action of the grantees in subjugating the 
peasantry by means of legal rights assigned to them by the state. 
"D.N. Jha, "Early Indian Feudalism: A Historiographical Critique", Presidential 
Addres9, Section Ancient India; Harbans Mukhia, "Was there Feudalism in Indian 
History", Presidential Address, Section Medieval India, Indian History Congress XL 
Session, Waltair Dec. 1979. I am grateful to Prof. Jha and Prof. ·Mukhia for providing 
copies of their Presidential Addresses. 
() 
V 
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It is, indeed, a moot point whether such complex social structures as 
feudalism can be established through administrative and legal 
procedures." Like D. N. Jha he agrees that the establishment of the 
feudal order presupposed a deep social and production crisis. Contrary 
to Jha, however, Mukhia rejects the existence of such a fundamental 
crisis in ancient and medieval Indian history. '' With a high quantum 
of agrarian surplus available in the form of land-revenue and cesses etc. 
to the State-which formed the chief instrument of exploitation-
because of high fertility of land and low subsistence level of the peasant 
a kind of equilibrium existed which facilitated the state's appropriation 
of the peasant's surplus in conditions of relative stability," Because of 
this relative stability and in the absence "of a major break in means 
of agricultural production" feudalism did not develop in India. In a 
mimeographed supplement to his Presidential Address, Mukhia 
concludes: "it is difficult to see the logic of such a comparison [between 
European and Indian feudalism] in the ancient and medieval periods 
when it might only persuade us to ask questions which have so little 
relevance to our history." 
III 
Recently, the analysis of the structure of Hindu kingdoms as carried 
out both by conventional historians and adherents of the concept of 
Indian feudalism has also been challenged by a group of American 
historians in the context of South Indian history. Among them Burton 
Stein figures most prominently. About a decade ago he introduced, 
with reference to B. Subba Rao, 14 in an elucidatory article the concept 
of "nuclear areas" which he designates as a major factor in the histori-
cal development of South India. According to Stein, the "nuclear areas 
of corporate institutions" and high population density are basically 
units of agrarian organization situated mainly in the drainage basins of 
the major rivers. They are fundamentally independent and self-governing 
Brahmin and Sat-Sudra settlements and relatively autonomous econo-
mic units. The district assembly (ncufu) of these nuclear areas was the 
only institution which commanded full authority over all resources of 
the nuclear areas. Otherwise the nuclear areas have "only the lightest 
links to the great warrior families of Kanchi or Tanjore, the capitals of 
Pallava and Chola dynasties". B. Stein therefore concludes that "the 
political system in early medieval South India may best be described 
as a multicentered system of power".15 
un. Subbarao, The Personality of India: A Study of the Development of Material 
Culture of India and Pakistan, Baroda, 1956. 
16B. Stein, "l tegration of the Agrarian System of South India", in Land Control 
and Social Strurture in Indian History , R .E. Frykenberg ed ., Madison, 1969, pp. 175-
216 (185). 
Fragmentation and Segmentation Versus Integration 243 
In 1973, Stein went several steps further in his critical approach. 
At a conference held by Duke University on "Realm and Region in 
Traditional India", he came forward with a highly critical and provo-
cative paper entitled "The Segmentary State in South Indian History" 
which was published in 1977.16 He derived the conception of the 
segmentary state from the anthropologist A. W. Southall and his studies 
on the Alur society in Eastern Africa. Stein admits that "the concept of 
the segmentary state, drawn from African material and adapted to early 
Indian society, may produce a certain, predictable culture shock 
general'ly, and for students of South Indian society, especially".17 
As mentioned above the segmentary state represents "a position on 
the continuum of governance formation". At the centre, where authority 
and political control was nearly absolute, it has some indicators for a 
unitary state, i.e. territorial sovereignty, centralized government, a 
specialized administrative staff, and the monopoly of coercion. But these 
indicators of a unitary state are shading off towards the periphery into 
mere ritual hegemony. In the outer areas there exist "several levels of 
subordinate foci" which are organized pyramidally. "The central and 
the peripheral authorities reflect the same model, the latter being 
reduced images of the former'' .18 The political fragility of the segmentary 
states is caused to a large extent by the ambiguous loyalty of the 
segments in the outer areas. "The more peripheral a subordinate 
authority is, the more chance it has to change its allegiance from one 
power pyramid to another" .19 
Stein elaborates two more points which are essential for under-
standing his concept of the segmentary state in South Indian history: 
The organization of units or the segments in the segmentary state as a 
whole is pyramidal. This pyramidal segmentation is continued in the 
various segments themselves. According to Stein the relationship between 
a centre of these segments (B) and their respective peripheral elements 
(C) is the same (italics by Stein) as the relationship between the prime 
centre (A) of the kingdom and its subordinate centres (B). The only 
distinction is that the B-C relationship is a ''reduced form" of the A-B 
relationship, "B" exercising authority over fewer people than "A". 
The important question whether there is really no qualitative difference 
between the A-B and B-C relations will be discussed later on in more 
detail. 
"B. Stein, "The Segmentary State in South Indian History" , in Realm and Region i11 
Traditional India, R.G. Fox. (ed.) New Delhi, 1977, pp. 3~51; B. Stein's forthcoming 
publication, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India which has been 
announced recently by the Oxfo:d University Press in India is not yet available to the 
author. 
17 Ibid., p. 49. 
11Ibid., p. 10. 
"Ibid. 
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Stein furthermore distinguishes sharply between actual political 
control on one side and ritual sovereignty on the other. All the 
numerous centres of the segmentary state do exercise actual political 
control over their own part or segment, but only one centre, the primary 
centre of the ruling dynasty, has the primacy of extending ritual sover-
eignty beyond its own borders. In a detailed elaboration Stein confines 
ritual sovereignty mainly to the state cult-in the case of the Co!a 
empire most impressively exemplified in the royal siva cult of Rajarajii.'s 
Rajarajesvara temple at Tanjore- and to the eleemosynary inscription's. 
In opposition to the conventional view which interprets these 
inscriptions as indicators of actual political control of the central 
dynasty over those localities where they are found, Stein interprets them 
as a clear evidence of ritual sovereignty with the aim of distributing "to 
all inhabited places the standardized message of a great kingship".20 
Ritual sovereignty thus formed the overarching ideological element 
which m:ide these units segments of a whole and "converted a congeries 
of local political systems into a segmentary state".21 
In this context, mention should also be made of a recent publication 
of G. W. Spencer. Although the concept of the segmentary state is not 
mentioned explicitly, it may contribute an important supplementary 
aspect.12 In his analysis of imperial Co!a policy during the 11 th century 
Spencer speaks of a "tax-tribute-plunder-continuum" which radiates 
from the royal centre beyond its own peripheral areas into the outer 
areas of the neighbouring kingdoms. Regular tax was collected only in 
the core area of the Colas, tribute was imposed on the outer autono-
mous small kingdoms, and plunder was the main objective of Cola 
warfare with the peripheral units of the neighbouring kingdoms and 
sometimes even with their centres. 
IV 
No doubt the discussions about Indian feudalism, though being quite 
controversial, and the more recent concept of the segmentary state in 
Indian history have contributed a lot to our knowledge of the late 
ancient and early medieval Indian states. Obviously, for the first time in 
Indian historiography their acrual structure and not their theoretical or 
iastric concept became the focal point of research. For the first time, 
the apparently invariable picture of either stagnant and somewhat 
chaotic kingdoms on the one hand or kingdoms of rather unchanging 
glory and greatness (interrupted only temporarily through military 
setbacks) on the other, was supplemented and partly replaced. R. S. 
M[bid., p. }7. 
11/hid., p 16. 
11G.W. Spencer, "The Politics of Plunder: The Cholas in the Eleventh Century 
Ceylon", in J. Asian Studi~s. XXXV, 1975/76 pp. 405-19. 
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Sharma's research depicts considerable structural change in the post-
Gupta period, particularly in the socio-economic fields which had been 
much neglected in previous studies. Whereas the Indian Feudalism 
School tends to emphasize the diachronic structural development during 
the early medieval period, B. Stein and G.W. Spencer emphasize the 
synchronic structural differentiation within a given kingdom. Without 
neglecting the historical dimension, they are particularly interested in 
analysing the structural elements which constitute the early medieval 
Hindu kingdoms and the method and means which allowed the central 
kings to maintain their powerful yet ambiguous position. 
Despite their undeniable merits I deem it necessary to raise several 
objections to these conceptions. I shall focus mainly on the questions of 
an alleged decentralization by land grants to Brahmanas and religious 
institutions in the context of Indian feudalism and on the concept of 
ritual sovereignty relating to the theory of the segmentary state. 
A major disadvantage of the theory of Indian feudalism is the prepon-
derance of its conceptual framework of decentralization and political 
fragmentation. This interpretatwn is certainly true with regard to 
Northern India during the period which followed the disintegration of 
the Gurjara-Pratihara empire in the second half of the 10th century 
A.D. and which Sharma calls the "heyday of political feudalism".2• 
But it does not explain the earlier growth of the great regional king-
doms and their considerable duration of rule. And, of course, the period 
which followed the disappearance of the classical Gupta empire in the 
early 6th century A.O. must be interpreted as a period of political 
fragmentation in North India and parts of Central India. But this frag-
mentation certainly was not caused through land donations either to 
religious or secular donees. A structural interpretation of the post-Gupta 
era reveals that this period of North-Indian decentralization coincided 
with a very intensive process of state formation on the local, subregio-
nal, and regional level in some parts of Northern India, in many parts 
of Central India and in most parts of Southern India. It was during this 
time that a process of indigenous state formation took place in many 
parts of India which, during previous centuries, had formed only tempo-
rarily provincial outposts of the classical (North!) Indian empires. 
During this period of early medieval indigenous state formation, 
Brahmins played a decisive role, but not by decentralizing the state 
through alienation of land and people as assumed by the school of 
nrhc question of how these principalities arose is answered by Sharma: "Some 
of them were obviously the results of the partition of the ruling family. But others 
resulted from the widespread practice of granting big and small territories to vassals 
and officials who entrenched themselves territorially and ended up as independent 
potentates" (R. S. Sharma, 1965, p. 159). But here also we have to ask whether this 
political fragmentation was a process of decentralization "from above" or whether 
new al/odial chiefs came up "from below" in a time of weakness of the centres. 
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Indian feudalism . Indeed, inscriptions prove that they were often settled 
systematically as administrative and, of course, religious specialists near 
the capitals and, in a kind of inner colonization, in the outer areas. 
This "constructive" element of settling Brahmins was even conceded by 
R.S. Sharma in the context of Orissa: "The significance of land grants 
to Brahmanas is not difficult to appreciate. The grantees brought new 
knowledge which improved cultivation and inculcated in the aborigines 
a sense of loyalty to the established order upheld by the rulers, who 
could therefore dispense with the service of extra staff for maintaining 
law and order".2' 
This valuable suggestion, however, was not followed up by a com-
prehensive study of this most important aspect of early medieval Indian 
land grants, either by Sharma25 or by other historians of the Indian 
Feudalism School. Instead, major attention was paid to the "discovery" 
of the few land grants to secular donees against the overwhelming 
majority of land grants to Brahmins and religious ·institutions.29 The 
necessity of proving the existence of land grants as beneficium to secular 
officers and chiefs is quite understandable because they are a necessary 
condition for the existence of feudalism. And instead of analysing the 
above-mentioned "positive" or constructive aspect of land grants to 
Brahmins as one of the major aspects of internal policy of early medie-
val Hindu kings, these land grants were generally interpreted under the 
aspect of alienation of land, people and power from the central dynasty 
and the formation of a class of landed intermediaries.27 
This one-sided interpretation of land grants to Brahmins by the 
Indian Feudalism School may at least partly be explained, through a 
precipitate transfer of the concept of European feudalism to the Indian 
context. In central European and particularly in early German history, 
ecclesiastical vassals had certainly played a considerable part in the 
decentralization and degeneration of the "Holy Roman Empire of 
German Nations" , a process which, on the other side, led to the ernan-
uR. S. Sharma, Indian Feudalism: c. 300-1200, op. cit., p, 281. 
usharma assumes this "negative" role of land donations already for the early 
Sltavfhana..period : "A second factor leading to decentralisation was the grant of 
fiscal rights to Buddhist and briihmaIJa beneficiaries", in Aspects of Political Ideas 
and Institutions in Ancient India , 2nd ed., Delhi 1968, p. 292; see also p. 303 f. 
"A good example-besides R .S. Sharma's own book on Indian Feudalism-is B. 
N.S. Yadava, "Secular Land Grants of the post-Gupta period and Some Aspects of 
the Growth of Feudal Complex in Northern India", in: D .C. Sircar p. 72-94. Some 
cases which Yadava mentions seem, however, to refer to sinecures as a reward after 
performing a deed rather than a beneficium, granted in order to secure the future 
support of the donee. (Max Weber distinguished between "true" Lehensfeudalismus 
and Pfrundenfeuda/ismus) 
17D.N. Jha, "Temples as Landed Magnates in Early Medieval South India (c. 
A.O. 700-1300)' ', in : RS . Sha1ma and V. Jha op cit . pp. 202-16; M. Liceria, "The 
Emergence of Brahmanas as Landed Intermediaries in Karnataka" in Indian Historical 
Rel'iew, T, 1974, pp, 28:36. 
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cipation of those socio-economic forces which initiated the break-
through of the modern ~ge. In India, however. religious donees had a 
very different position. First of all there was no papacy behind or above 
them to strengthen their position and they never had the means (nor the 
intentiqn?) to entrench themselves militarily against their secular donors. 
An investiture struggle would have been unthinkable in the context of 
Hindu kingdoms. If we want to compare the Indian development with 
feudalism in Europe at all, we should not only-as is usually done-
look at the classical form of feudalism after the territorial principalities 
or the "ethnic" duchies had developed in Germany. More fruitful for a 
structural comparison is the Franconian kingdom during the period of 
transition from the Merovingians to the Carolingians. Even German 
Medievalists who usually tend to characterize the classical vassalage as 
"main instrument of breaking up central power" concede that "in 
Franconian time vassalage was the only means of intensive state forma-
tion and strengthening royal coercion".28 
V 
It is exactly in this context of early state formation, characterized by 
limited coercion, near non-existence of an indigenous administrative 
staff, reduced interregional communication and trade, and scarcity of 
coinage that land grants to Brahmins in the post-Gupta period have to 
be understood. Therefore, before assuming alienation ofroyal power and 
resources through land donations to Brahmins and their endowment 
with immunities (parihiira) and privileges, one should always ask whether 
the royal donor had really been able to exercise all those powers him-
self which he transferred to the donee. In many cases, the de jure 
cransfer of the regalities might actually have brought about, for the first 
time, their de facto execution. By land donations to loyal Brahmins out-
side the central area of the ruling dynasty, the king might also have 
deprived potential opponents among his siimantas of their resources 
rather than relinquished tribute which he bad never been able to extract 
regularly. During the process of early state formation in the post-Gupta 
period the Brahmins thus might well have acted as pace-makers of royal 
authority and coercion and its legitimation rather than as agents of 
feudalization. Because of their own authority and peaceful way of 
living they were much more suited to this job than the hated royal 
"K. Bos!, Lehenswesen, in Rossler-Franz, Sachworterbuch zur Dtutschtn Geschi-
chte, Munchen, 1958. The German historian O H,ntze argued very similarly as early 
as 1919: "Not feudal degeneration 'denatured' the (German) empire but vice versa: 
The whole feudal development is intelligible only under the assumption that this 
(early Franconian) empire had been . no real state but something quite different" . 
0. Hintze, "Wcsen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus" ("Nature ar;d expansion of 
F ."), reprinted in: 0 . Hintze, Staat und Verfassung, Gottingen, 1970, p. 86. 
248 HERMANN KuLKE 
officers (rajapuru,1a etc.). Even in the core area of the central dynasty, 
which was certainly under its direct control, the endowment of agrahara 
or Brahmin villages with immunities prohibiting entry of royal officers 
and troops should not be considered under the aspect of alienation of 
royal regalities only. The symbiotic relationship of the Brahmins with 
the dynasty made them a p~rt of the establishment which by itself was 
interested in its perpetuation, based on a smooth cooperation between 
brahma1'},a and k,1atra. 29 Opposition which could be coped with by mili-
tary coercion only was certainly not to be expected from these Brahmin 
villages. The systematic settlement of Brahmins in villages around the 
early capitals and their endowment with immunities may even in some 
cases have tended to create a partly "demilitarized zone" around the 
royal seat, because the immunities of the Brahmin villages certainly had 
to be respected by potential opponents among the royal relatives and 
powerful officers of the inner circle. 
VI 
Particularly with regard to the important question of land grants to 
Brahmins and religious institutions and their function within the context 
of the Indian states, Stein's interpretation offers a major advantage. As 
has been shown above, he regards them as an essential part of the 
"ritual sovereignty" of the segmentary state, and states in his studies on 
the Co!as that ''we can no longer interpret such grants as indicating an 
alienation of resources of the Chola central government".10 Stein's 
approach is corroborated by an earlier article by G.W. Spencer on 
"Religious Networks and Royal Influence in Eleventh Century South 
India" in which he pointed out that the establishment and costly patro-
nage of the new temple at Tanjore by Rii.jaraja I "was in fact a method 
adopted by an ambitious ruler to enhance his very uncertain power."11 
The major contribution of Stein's theory has to be seen in his analysis 
of the segmentary . structure of the Co!a empire on one side and the 
overarching function of what he calls the "ritual sovereignty" on the 
other. For the South Indian Cola empire, with its strong and autochtho-
nous local "segments'' as represented in the niiqus based on ethnic and 
lineage affiliation and on one thousand years' documented local history, 
"For the brahmaf)a·kjatra relationship, see particularly L. Dumont, "Conception 
of Kingship in Ancient India" in L. Dumont, Religion, Politics and History in India, 
Paris, /The Hague, 1970, pp. 63-88; J-C. Heesterman, "Power and Authority in Indian 
Tradition", in Tradition and Politics in South Asia, R. J . Moore ed., New Delhi, 1979 
pp. 60-85; J.D .M. Derret, "Rajadharma", in J.Asian Studies. XXXV, 1976, 
pp. 597-609. 
•
0B. Stein, ibid., p. 13 . 
11G .W. Spencer, "Religious Networks and Royal Influence in Eleventh Century 
South India", in J . of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, XII, 1969, 
pp . 42-56. 
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the conception of a segmentary state sounds fascinating and is much 
more convincing than any other conception offered so far. 
However, there are a few points which should be disiussed before 
acceptiag the concept as an established theory and particularly before 
trying to establish its validity for other regions of India. Since the ideo-
logical element rightly plays an important role in his concept of "ritual 
sovereignty'', much depends on his interpretation of Hinduism. In his 
refutation of the concept of Indian feudalism in South Indian history, 
he questions the existence of a "politically relevant moral order" for all 
castes in Hinduism. He points out that Hinduism as an aspect of 
kingship ideology also "provided for considerable instability. The power 
of political legitimation was vested with local Brahmans responsible to 
no superiors and the religion was characterized by a basic discontinuity 
between relatively high-caste (Brahman and non-Brahman) participants 
in Vedic sect activities and the mass of Hindus involved in highly locali-
zed, non-Vedic, folk religious affiliation. This discontinuity in Hinduism 
considered as a morally binding force-the gulf between the high and 
the low- is a factor which historians have neglected. The other side of 
the coin of ritual exclusiveness is a discontinuous moral order".3z 
Though this argument is brought forward by Stein in order to prove 
the non-applicability of the concept of feudalism (in which a binding 
moral order formed the most essential basis of vassalage) to Indian 
history, it may also be of crucial importance for understanding his con-
cept of the segmentary state in general and of ritual sovereignty in 
particular. Of course, Hinduism was primarily based on and derived its 
strength from the two poles of the "great" all-Indian Sanskrit tradition 
and the many local or "little" traditions. But as has beeen shown 
recently in connection with the Jagannatha cult and the regional tradi-
tion of Orissa, these two poles did by no means remain dichotomic 
entities.33 Since the last centuries of the first millennium A.D. they 
became increasingly joined in an uninterrupted continuum, focusing on 
new regional traditions. This is not the place to go into details of the 
development of these regional traditions which, in a way, became more 
and more the true melting pot of the Sanskrit tradition and the local 
village traditions. In the field of religion these regional traditions were 
best known through their various bhakti cults. They diminished and in 
some cases even eliminated the previous discontinuity between "Vedic 
sect activities and the mass of Hindus involved in highly localized, non-
Vedic folk religious activities" and, what matters most in our context, 
HB. Stein. "State and the Agrarian Order in Medieval South India: A Historio-
graphical Critique", in Essays on South India, B. Stein ed., New Delhi, 1976, 
pp. 64-91 (86). 
HA . Eschmann, H. Kulke, G . C. Tripathi (eds.), Tire C11/tof J11gannatlr and the 
Regional Traditon of Orissa, New Delhi, 1978. 
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they bridged at least ideologically ··the gulf between the high and the 
low". 
These regional traditions originally centred around the places of 
pilgrimage (tlrtha) with their priestly yet popular legendary accounts 
which were later collected and magnified in regional collections as for 
instance Sekkilar's Periya Pura1:umi,the "Tamil Bible". The regional 
traditions furthered the developme&'t of a new sense of regional loyalty3' 
based on regional cults, regional languages and literature, caste and 
lineage affiliations etc. 
It seems that this regional loyalty-as a forerunner of modern regiona-
lism--increasingly became the new ideological basis of the regional king-
doms. Instead of deriving their legitimation from Vedic Brahmins settled 
near the-capitals, the rajiis of the great regional empires extended their 
royal patronage more and more to the enlargement and embellishment 
of already existing llrthas, many of which were associated with indigenous 
pre-brahmanic cults. These places of pilgrimage, with their popular bhakti 
cults and their numerous festivals, particularly the great car-festivals in 
the South, meanwhile had become the true centres of popular religion 
bridging the gap between the "high and the low". Once the rajas were 
directly associated with these places of pilgrimage, they were provided 
by these centres with an already existing network of pilgrimage. It was 
through these established channels that the message of the new kingship 
ideology, based on a more direct association of the king with regional 
gods, as whose earthly deputies they claimed to rule,35 reached even the 
remotest villages of the kingdom without further royal effort. After the 
rituo-ideological activities and performances had shifted from the Vedic 
altar and the exclusive magic performances (as for instance rajasuya and 
aivamedha) to the practice of land donations to priests and temples and 
grand royal visits to popular places of pilgrimage, 36 the regional tradi-
"R. Thapar, A History of India, Harmondsworth, 1966, p. 255. 
11H. Kulke, "Jagannlltha as theState Deity under the Gajapatis -ofOrissa",in 
A. Eschmann, op. cit., pp. 199-209. Also the forthcoming publication H. Kulk.e, 
"King Anailgabhima III, the Veritable Founder of the Gajapati Kingship and the 
Jaganniitha Trinity at Puri", in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1981, pp. 26-39. 
For Maharashtra, where agrarian expansion and territorial integration till the 
Maratha period were directly linked with royal patronage of local indigenous deities, 
see G. D. Sontheimer, Birobii, Mhaskobii und Khandobii. Ursprung, Geschichte und 
Umwe/r von pastoraien Gottheiten in Maharastra, Wiesbaden, 1976. 
"Nicholas B. Dirks, "Political Authority and Structural Change in Early South 
Indian History", in The Indian Ee. and Soc. Hist. Rev., XIII, 2, 1976, pp. 125-158; 
Arjun Appadurai, "Kings, Sects and Temples in South India, 1350-1700 A.D.", in 
Soutl, Indian Temples, B. Stein ed ., New Delhi, 1978 pp. 47-74; Ronald Inden, "The 
Ceremony of the Great Gift (mahadiina) : Structure and Historical Context in Indian 
Ritual and Society", paper presented at the Vlth European Conference on Modern 
South Asian Studies, Paris 8.-13.7.1978. 
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tion enabled the rulers to communicate in a common cultural language, 
much more than it was possible in the previous centuries. 
The later Co\a kings seemed to have realized this new trend in the 
religious development of the South. B. Stein rightly points out that the 
royal Siva cult, as begun by Rajaraja I and continued by his son Rajen-
dracoja in the newly built monumental temples at their capitals of 
Tanjore and GangaikoMachpfapuram was a "distinctive new departure 
in South Indian Hinduism". But he also admits that these temples were 
atypical because '• both were funerary or samadhi shrines meant to 
enhance the importance of the ruler and his kingly lineage in ways 
similar to the Khmer (Cambodian) 'god king' cult".37 However, it seems 
to me that their uniqueness _was not only due to their being samadhi 
shrines but perhaps even more to their unprecedented and, in the Indian 
context, obviously too close association with royalty. In contrast to 
Cambodia, Hinduism in India, though providing the theoretical frame-
work, was not in favour of allowing kings to become in practice as 
directly associated with any type of a genuine Devariija cult as has been 
assumed in the case of the kings of Angkor.38 But obviously Rajaraja 
and his son had tried to establish a new and in South India hitherto 
never practised type of royal deification, associated with Sivaism and 
focussed on the new "imperial" temples which were directly linked to 
the rulers. But as newly erected temples, they were not yet embedded in 
the network of the religious topography. Rajaraja'sfamous temple inscrip-
tions provide a good picture of his rather hectic activities to create a new 
network linking the new imperial temple at the centre with the outer 
provinces of the empire. 
It is therefore not surprising that Rajaraja's and Rajendra's new ritual 
policy was discontinued by their successors. Instead of patronizing the 
temples at Tanjore and Gangaikondacholapuram or constructing new 
ones39 and imposing their cult on, and linking it with, the already 
existing network of indigenous religious centres, the later Colas shifted 
their religious activities and royal patronage to these centres of an already 
established ''greatness" (mlihiitmya) and their networks of pilgrimage. 
Whereas Rajariija's inscriptions in Tanjore had propagated an alleged 
association of the new temple at Tanjore with the much older "Golden 
11B. Stein, "Integration of the Agrarian System of South India", op. cit , p. 24. 
HE(sewhere it has been shown that even in Angkor there existed no genuine royal 
Devariija cult because Siva himself and not the king of Angkor was the "King of the 
Gods" (devaraja), although apotheosis of living kings was still stronger in Angkor 
than in India. H. Kulke, The Devardja Cult, Data Paper No. 108, Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, 1978. . 
stTherc w:.1s, however, a revival of the earlier tradition under the later Co\a 
monarchs Riijaraja II (1146-73) and Kulottui:iga III (1178-1218) who built the royal 
temples at Darasuram and Tribhuvanam. The Darasuram temple was even called 
Rajarlijesvara in its inscriptions, certainly in conformity with the Rajarajes'vara temple 
of Tanjore. 
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Hall" (kanaka-sabha) of Siva Nataraja in Chidambaram in order to 
increase the fame of his temple at Tanjore, Kulottunga I ( 1070-1118) 
began to rebuild and magnify Chidambaram itself, a work which was 
continued by several of his successors. •0 An analysis of the Hiral).yavar-
man legend of the Cidambaramahatmya shows41 to what extent Kulot-
. tunga, being an usurper to the Cola throne, tried to establish his 
legitimacy through a direct ~onnection with this centre of Nataraja, the 
"King of Dancers", the most important manifestation of Siva in South 
India. From the early 12th century onwards, Kulottunga's successors 
concentrated their main activities and royal patronage on a systematic 
enlargement and embellishment of the great centres of pilgrimage of the 
Sooili. ' 
In South India the early 12th century thus marked the transfer of the 
ideological performance to another stage and witnessed the beginning of 
a hitherto unknown policy of enlarging and often completely reconstruc-
ting the already existing places of pilgrimage. This change, however, 
was not confined to the South. King Anantavarman Co4aganga, Kulot-
tunga's contemporary and arch-enemy on the Ganga throne of Orissa, 
after his conquest of Central Orissa, built "his" imperial temple not in 
Kalinganagara, his ancestral capital in Kalinga, but in the famous tTrtha 
of Puri. The ~eight of the temple at Puri (214 feet) nearly corresponds to 
that of Tanjore (216 feet).· But the temple at Puri was not dedicated to 
an orthodox or even "royal" deity but to Puru~ottama-Jagannatha with 
'an obviously tribal background. Whereas the imperial Co!as of the early 
11 th century had constructed new imperial temples which were meant to 
enhance directly the glory and divine association of their royal founders, 
in the early 12th century Kulotturiga I and Coqaganga enlarged those 
already existing tlrthas with which they and their successors tried to 
become associated. In Orissa this "popular royal" cult became the germ 
of the new regional tradition and the main source of legitimation of 
Orissats Gajapati kings who claimed to rule as Jagannatha's son (putra) 
and military deputy (riiuta).41 
It was necessary to go into all these lengthy details in order to explain 
my uneasiness with Stein's notion of an alleged ''discontinuity in 
Hinduism". Of course there was and still is discontinuity in Hinduism. 
But the question is whether during the period of intensive bhakti cults 
and pilgrimage the discontinuity was more marked than in any other 
"J.C. Harle The Temple. Gateways in South lndia: The Architecture and Icono• 
graphy of the Chi/dambaram Gopuras, Oxford, 1963. 
"H. Kulke, "Funktionale Erklarung eines sUdindischen Miihiitmyas. Die Legende 
Hira9yavarmans und das Leben des Co(a-Konigs Kulottunga I", in Saecu/um, XX, 
1969, pp. 412-22. ' 
0 H. Kulke, Jaganniitha-Kult und Gajap:,ti-Konigtum. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
re/igiifser Legitimation hindustischer, Herrscher, Wiesbaden 1979; D.C. Sircar, Studies in 
Fe/igious Life of Ancient and Medieval India, Delhi, 1971. 
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given world religion, excluding perhaps only Islam, but certainly inclu-
ding medieval Christianity. Most likely we have to distinguish carefully 
between the various cultural regions of India, and it may be true that a 
discontinuity might . have existed to a larger extent in South India than, 
for example, in Orissa. But, generally speaking, discontinuity in 
Hinduism seems to have been particularly minimal in the ideological 
aspect of Hinduism wherever kings patronized popular indigenous local 
or regional cults which bridged the gulf between the high and the low. 
This conclusion is of great importance for tb.e evaluation of B. Stein's 
concept of the segmcntary state in South Indian history. Its main 
features are as much the political and territorial segmentation, both 
horizontal and vertical, as the "ritual sovereignty" which formed the 
overarching ideological element and "converted a congeries of local 
political systems into a segmentary state". We are able to follow Stein up 
to this point without any hesitation. But our doubts arise against his 
strict differentiation between actual political control and ritual sovereignty. 
In connection with the eleemosynary inscriptions he writes: 
The thousands of Chola inscriptions which are distributed unevenly 
over the vast macro-region of the southern Indian peninsula are taken 
in the conventional view to be evidence of the direct control of the 
Chola state. In fact, they are not evidence of political control, but of 
ritual sovereignty. The difference between viewing inscriptions on 
stone and copper as evidence of control and viewing them as ritual 
documents is fundamental. .. Once the idea of ritual sovereignty as 
distinct from political sovereignty or control is considered, many 
aspects of Chola history take on a plausible pattern lacking in the 
conventional view of the Chola state." 
The distinction between political control and ritual sovereignty is 
certainly of great heuristic value and it has indeed been neglected or 
even cop,pletely overlooked by conventional historians. But we have to 
ask whether there is sufficient evidence to substantiate such a general 
statement as given by B. Stein who is rather reluctant to assume any 
direct political authority in those Co\a inscriptions which are found 
outside the central "segments'' controlled by theCo\as. Generally speaking 
and as already mentioned above regarding the function of land grants in 
the context of ''Indian feudalism" one has to check each inscription 
separately, particularly with regard to the intention of the donation, 
which in many cases might have been of much greater political relevance 
than can be inferred from the standa.rdized ritual message of the 
inscriptions. 
But I am here not so much concerned with problems of detailed 
0 n. Stein, "lntc11ration of the Agrarian System of South India", op. cir., p. 17. 
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interpretation of the inscriptions. I should like to ask the more general 
question how far we can apply this heuristically valuable distinction 
to a structural analysis of the medieval Hindu kingdoms. 
According to Stein this "fundamental difference" is an essential part 
of the concept of the segmentary state which is based on the notion of 
a congeries of local political systems consisting of"units" or "segments". 
They remain basically autonomous because according to Stein the royal 
orders w_hich are sent to them through royal officers and which are 
inscribed in the inscriptions are "not evidence of political control but of 
ritual sovereignty". Even if we accept the relevance of this distinction 
and concede that many inscriptions might have been intended to show 
ritual sovereignty instead of direct political control, we should ask 
whether this type of ritual sovereignty did not have a direct consequence 
for the political control, too. In a traditional society, particularly in Tndia, 
ritual sovereignty seems to be an integral part and sometimes even a 
pace-maker of political power. Even in today's India one can observe 
for instance the seemingly unnecessary and tiresome touring programme 
of the Ministers and their participation in each and every meeting which 
follows a very distinct and "ritualistic" manner. Even more obvious are 
the "rituals" which have to be followed during meetings of some local 
associations, the complicated arrangements on the "dais" which often 
r~mind one of the durbar tradition, and the standardized speeches, 
Participation in a "political ritual'' itself is obviously not only an impor-
tant display of power but also seems to be an important means to enhance 
personal influence and power. In a traditional society with its very 
clearly defined norms, display of political power therefore should not be 
confined oniy to direct command over men and means. 
Despite the undeniable progress of B. Stein's analysis compared to 
previous explanations of the structure of medieval Hindu kingdoms, his 
sharp differentiation between actual political control and ritual soverei-
gnty therefore has its disadvantages too. By questioning the direct political 
effect of the "ritual documents" (as he calls the Co!a inscriptions), he 
separates the imperial level and the local political systems, confining 
their relations to the sporadic ideological performances of the centre. 
The problem is obviously whether we have to view these "ritual docu-
ments" as "ritualised substitutes" for a genuine policy of coercion or 
whether we interpret them as documents of a "ritual policy" which is 
not a substitute for, but part of a genuine policy. I personally prefer to 
interpret them as documents ofa systematic ritual policy which was as 
much a part of the general "power policy" as, for instance, economic or 
military policies. 
If we accept this inference, it has some implication for the structural 
analysis of the medieval Hindu kingdoms. It shows that there might 
have been a mor~ direct political relationship between the imperial level 
and the local segments than conceded by B. Stein, even if it manifested 
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itself in documents of ritual policy. The intensity of these relations 
certainly varied from kingdom to kingdom and within a kingdom from 
ruler to ruler and should be analysed accordingly. But display of ritual 
sovereignty should not be denounced a priori as a weak substitute but 
analysed as one of the genuine political means in a traditional society of 
implementing political authority. 
VII 
After ra1smg my doubts against foo strict a differentiation between 
alleged imperial ritual sovereignty and local political control I also wish 
to question the degree of alleged rigid segmentation of medieval Hindu 
kingdoms as explained by B. Stein in his concept of the segmentary 
state in South Indian history.44 Though I do feel much indebted to his 
structural analysis, I am afraid that the "analytical scalpel", which he 
otherwise handles in so masterly a manner, seems to miss or to even 
dissect an important inherent integrating element of the medieval Hindu 
kingdoms. Throughout the period with which we are concerned here, 
integration operated on several levels, e.g. on the territorial, cultural, 
social and economic level. I shall deal here with the first two aspects 
and substantiate my delineations with examples from Orissa. 
Orissa provides an excellent example of a continuous and stepwise 
territorial integration. In its early history, Orissa had formed for a 
short period the province of the great empire of the Mauryas in the 
3rd century a.c. and, in the late 1st century a.c., was the centre of a 
shortlived empire under king Kharavela. Apart from a few historically 
isolated archaeological finds in the neighbourhood of Bhubaneswar, we 
possess little evidence to understand the legacy of these early empires in 
the early centuries A.O. In any case, the process of indigenous state 
formation began only a few centuries after the vanishing of Kharavela's 
kingdom on the subregional level with an obviously different character. 
The basis of the principalities and small kingdoms of Orissa of the early 
centuries A.O. usually were "nuclear areas" near the heads of the deltas 
along the coast of Bengal or, further upstream, in the riverine basins. 
"In his article on "Agrarian Integration in South India" Stein is not as rigid. 
He shows that agrarian integration operated till the early 14th ,century particularly 
within the nuclear areas and their tribal borderland through expansion of irrigated 
rice cultivation under the "rule" of the periyanacfu assemblies. Economic integration 
beyond the nuclear areas was brought about through the great itinerant merchant 
guilds (niinadesi) . Summarizing the basic features of the nuclear areas, Stein even 
mentioned as one of their characteristic featu1es "religious bodies which were linked 
to other similar institutions in other nuclear areas" (p. 188). But this important 
integrant aspect evidently has not become part of his concept of the Segmentary 
State . Here he seems to confine "cultural communication" to the "overarching 
ideological element". 
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The most significant economic feature of these nuclear areas was irriga-
ted rice cultivation. They were usually separated by mountains of jungles 
which were still inhabited by aboriginal tribes. 
As far as our historical knowledge goes, these nuclear areas were 
under small Hindu rajiis who ruled their territory with the help of newly 
settled Brahmins according to the Hindu siistras. But, as pointed out 
elsewhere, the early inscriptions of these rajas make it clear that most of 
them originated from one of the tribes which surrounded these nuclear 
areas.45 Security and legitimation of Hindu rule under these circums-
tances depended largely on the loyalty of these tribes which was 
enhanced through the acknowledgement of one of the tribal deities as 
tutelary deity by the new rli.j families. Examples are the god Gokaq1es-
vara, who was worshipped on the Mahendragiri mountain as the tute-
lary deity by the Gan.gas of Kalinga-nagara and StambhesvarT, the 
"Lady of the Pillar" who was acknowledged both by the SulkT kings 
(obviously a dynasty of the ancient saulika tribe) and the Bhai'ijas of 
Central Orissa. Generally speaking, and contrary to B. Stein's findings 
in South Indian history, the nuclear areas in Orissa throughout their 
history were centres of integration of tribal elements rather than of their 
"sustained displacement" as Stein has stated in connection with South 
India.46 The early history of these nuclear areas and their rulers is 
largely unknown.47 But in the middle of the fourth century A.D., Samu-
dragupta during his conquest of the "southern region" defeated three 
chiefs in Western Orissa (Dak~ii:ia Kosala) and, on his march further 
South, four chiefs or small rajas on the coast between the Mahendragiri 
and the Go~avari rivers. Though we do not know much more than 
their names and their location, Samudragupta's famous Allahabad inscri-
ption shows that at least in those portions of Orissa which he had passed 
through there existed many small principalities in the middle of the 4th 
century A.D. However, it is mainly after the downfall of the Gupta 
empire in the early 6th century that indigenous epigraphical sources on 
the development of the nuclear areas of Orissa are available. 
From these inscriptiops we know about four such nuclear areas on the 
Orissan coast, three in the valleys and one on the upper plains of the 
highlands of Orissa. On the coast w~ find the following nuclear areas 
(from Southwest to Northeast): 
"H. Kulke, "Early State Formation and Royal Legitimation in Tribal Areas of 
Eastern India," in Aspects of Tribal Life in South Asia I: Strategy and Survival, R. 
Moser and Mohan K. Gautama (eds.), Studia Ethnologica Bernensia, I, 1979, pp. 29-
38, reprinted in Sidelights on History and Culture of Orissa, M. N. Das ed., Cuttack, 
1978, pp. 104-14, see also J,G . de Casparis "Inscriptions and South Asian Dynastic 
Tradition", in R. J. Moore, op cit. pp. 103-27. 
"B. Stein, ''Integration of the Agrarian System of South India", op. cit. p. 185. 
u1 am not concerned here with the alleged rule of the Ku~li.Qas, Murundas and 
Guptas over parts of Orissa and the temporary conquest of South and Central Orissa 
by the l',,fa~haras of South Kalinga . 
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(i) Ka/inga, centred in the delta area of the Nagavali and Vam-
shadhara rivers in the Srikakulam district of northern Andhra Pradesh. 
Though outside Orissa proper, Kalinga was of great importance for 
the further development of Orissa after it had become the nuclear area 
of the Eastern Gangas at the end of the 5th century A.D. Their capi-
tal Kalinganagara was situated on the bank of the river with the 
significant name "bearer of the dynasty" ("valJ1fa-dhara"); 
(ii) Kongoda MarJcfala, situated on the western coast of the Chilka 
lake and in the lower valley of the Rishikulya river is identical with 
present-day Ganjam District. It was the homeland of the Sailodbhava 
dynasty since the late 5th or early 6th century A.D. and was elabora-
tely described by the Chinese pilgrim Hsuan Tsang in the early 7th 
century. 
(iii) DalqilJ,a ("South") Tosala in the southern Mahanadi delta had 
been the centre of the Mauryan province of Kalinga with its capital at 
Tosali (=Dhauli?) near Bhubaneswar and also of Kharavela's empire 
with its capital at Kalinganagara-near Bhubaneswar. Though for a 
short period in the late 6th century A.D. small dynasties tried to 
establish themselves here (e.g. the Vigrahas), Dak~iQ.a, Tosala 
remained for centuries the bone of contention between neighbouring 
dynasties. The Mahanadi delta as a whole was too large to be ruled 
and defended by the early small medieval kingdoms. 
(iv) Uttara ("North") Tosala, situated in the northern delta area of 
the Mahanadi and in the Brahmani delta, is identical with the modern 
Cuttack and Balasore districts. Its chronological and territorial 
demarcations against Odra and Utkal which later came to be known 
in this area are still disputed. After short-Jived dynasties in the late 6th 
and early 7th centuries (Manas and Dattas) the most important 
dynasty which came up in this region was the Bhauma Karas since the 
late 7th century. 
In the valleys of the rivers Mahanadi and Brahmani three important 
nuclear areas were situated: 
(v) Dak:jirJ.a Kosa/a comprised in its Orissan part mainly the fertile 
plain of the Mahanadi valley the region between the present Hirakud 
reservoir and Sonpur and included the Tel valley south of Sonpur. 
Since the early 6th century parts of Dak~iq.a Kosala, together with 
some of its neighbouring tracts, were ruled in succession by the Sara-
bhapuriyas, Pa.Q.guvarpsts, and the S0mavarps1s. The latter b.!came 
most important for the whole of Orissa when they conquered coastal 
Orissa. 
( vi) Khinjali-Mat14ala lying between Dak~iQa Kosala and. coastal Tosala 
in the less prosperous Baudh valley region of the Mahanadi . It was 
ruled by a Bhaiija dynasty in the 8th and 9th centuries. 
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(vii) Kodlilaka Ma!lcfala in the lower Brahman} valley in the present 
Dhenkanal district form~d ,. the home of the Siilki dynasty (8th/9th 
centuries). 
In the highlands of Orissa we know of several smaller nuclear areas of 
early principalities. Most important among them was: 
(viii) Khijjihgako!{a in the present-day Mayurbhanj district of 
North Orissa with Khiching as its capital, famous for its temples. It 
was ruled by another Bhanja dynasty since the 8th century. To the west 
of Khiching in the surroundings of the later feudatory state of 
Keonjhar, epigraphical findings (Sitabhinji and Asanapat) prove that 
this whole area was under the control of some otherwise unknown 
Bhaiija kings as early as the 4-6th centuries A,D, 
The history of medieval Orissa from the 6th to the 16th century is 
characterized by a stepwise yet continuous process of territorial integra-
tion of these nuclear areas. During the 5th and 6th centuries none of the 
rulers of these areas was able to extend his power permanently into a 
neighbouring nuclear area. In all cases, their power was still confined to 
their own homelands. Obviously the socio-economic development of 
these nuclear areas had not yet reached a stage which permitted a consi-
derable extension of their political power. It was only in the 7th century 
after Orissa had been drawn temporarily into the great North Indian 
power struggle between Ha~a. Sasanka and Pulakesin II, that the 
Sailodbhavas of Koilgoda were able to extend their power into Dak~il).a 
Tosala or today's Puri district. The next step towards territorial integra-
tion took place under the Bhauma Karas of Uttara Tosala in the 8th 
century. They extended their sway from their capital Jajpur over the 
whole coastal region of present-day Orissa, including the northern parts 
of Uttara Tosala, Dak~il).a Tosala and Kongoda in the South. Further-
more several rulers of smaller nuclear areas in the hinterland acknow-
ledged their sovereignty (e.g. the Siilkis of Kodalaka MaQ.qala and the 
Bhanjas of Khiiijali Mai;i4ala). The main achievement of the Bhauma-
Karas, however, was the permanent unification of three nuclear areas 
(Uttara and Dak~i9a Tosala and Kongoda) under one rule. 
The next step of territorial integration took place in the 10th century 
A.O. when the S0mava111s1s of Dak~iq.a Kosala conquered Khinjali 
Mai:iqala and coastal Orissa and unified them for the first time with their 
homeland in Western Orissa. Thus they ruled over the three riverine 
nuclear areas (Dak~il).a Kosala, Khinjali and Kodala~a Maq.qala) and 
the three coastal areas (Uttara and Dak~i9a Tosala and Koi:igoda). It is 
therefore not inappropriate to call them the forefathers of modern 
Orissa. However, their kingdom fell apart in the 11th century when a 
branch again began to rule independently over its western parts. 
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In c. 1112 King Anantavarman Coqaganga, one of the Eastern 
Gangas of Kalinganagara in Kalinga, conquered central Orissa and 
extended his rule in the following decades from modern Midnapur dis-
trict in West Bengal up to the northern banks of the Godavari in 
Andhra Pradesh. His career marked the beginning of the great regional 
kingdom of Orissa under the Gahgas and the Suryavaqis[s ( 1112-1568 
,\.D.). Under their rule the four major coastal nuclear areas i.e. Uttara 
and Dak~iQa Tos~Ja, Koilgoda and Kalinga were permanently integra-
ted. Their sway over the peripheral coastal areas of Dandabhukti 
(Midnl;lpore) and South Kalinga (Vizagapatnam) was unchallenged, 
although we don't know the exact nature of their relations with them. 
The lower riverine nuclear areas of the Mahanadi and Brahmani rivers 
were also ruled directly, whereas Khinjali Ma9,qala and particularly 
Dak~iQa Kosala in the upper Mahanadi valley were only temporarily 
conquered. 
In 1436 Kapilendra, an army officer and son of a local chieftain 
(niiyaka), usurped the throne and established the SOryavarp.sa dynasty. 
He became the most powerful Hindu king of his time in the whole of 
India. Under him and his two successors the Orissan empire extended 
from the Ganges down to the Krishna and, temporarily, even to the 
Kaveri in the far South. 
In connection with our discussion on the structure of medieval Hindu 
kingdoms it is not so much the remarkable extension of the Orissan 
empire which matters here. The novelty of Kapilendra's success was his 
usurpation of the throne. All the previous dynastic changes had taken 
place after a successful military conquest, led by an already established 
king who was in full command of the means of his own dynasty. Each 
conqueror from the Sailodbhavas to Co<taganga came "from outside", 
uniting his own homeland with the conquered areas and thus carrying 
on the stepwise process of territorial integration. Kapilendra on the 
other hand seized power without domestic troops of his own and was 
able to keep it against a strong opposition of members and followers of 
the overthrown dynasty. And what is most surprising, against all expec-
tations the Orissan kingdom did not disintegrate into the previous 
nuclear areas. Though it is likely that the priests of the state deity 
Jagannatha at Puri played an important role in this coup de'tat48 
Kapilendra's success shows that during the previous centuries territorial 
integration had taken place which had led to the erosion of the auto-
chthonous political power of the former nuclear areas. Although no 
detailed research has yet been done on the structural changes from the 
early (perhaps truly segmentary) kingdoms such as the Bhauma Karas 
to the Gan.gas and Suryavaqisis, the change is obvious. Parallel to the 
"G. N. Dash, "The Evolution of Priestly Power : The Siiryaval!lsa Period," in 
Eschmann, op. cit., pp. 209-22. 
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stepwise territorial integration of new nuclear areas into the kingdom of 
Orissa, at least in some cases local rulers are known to have been repla-
ced by governors and officials of the central kings. Similar to the prac-
tice which meanwhile prevailed in the Muslim states and the Vijayana-
gara empire, the SiiryavarpsTs furthermore seem to have introduced a 
system of allotting districts, particularly in the hilly hinterland, to local 
chiefs or military officers in order to create a "cordon sanitaire" around 
the vulnerable central Mahanadi delta. It is significant that many of the 
later feudatory states of Orissa trace their history back to the time of the 
Siiryavaqi~is.49 ' 
VIII 
Integration as a major factor of medieval Hindu kingdoms, however, 
was not confined to territorial integration. It was supplemented and 
supported by cultural integration which operated mainly through reli-
gion and language. Regional traditions became the backbone of this 
cultural integration and communication. They existed "below" the 
official "overarching ideological element" (p. 253), though of course they 
were tapped by the rajas for their ideology, because, the integration of 
local traditions into regional traditions, meant that local loyalty became 
supplemented by a regional loyalty. 
Orissa provides an excellent example of cultural integration through a 
regional tradition. The core of this tradition was the cult of Jagannatha 
who was acknowledged by the kings of Orissa since the 13th century as 
their overlord_ (samraja). It has been shown elsewhere to what extent the 
Jagannatha cult as a state cult became part of the royal policy and 
legitimation.50 But the Jagannatha cult was never solely the overarching 
royal ideology. It was the central part of the regional tradition which · 
operated and integrated on several levels "outside" or "below" the 
official ritual sovereignty. I shall try to explain this in a short and,' 
perhaps, too systematizing way. 
In large parts of Orissa we can trace at least four ''levels" of divinity. 
The "imperial" level is represented by Jagannatha, the "Lord of the 
World". The state cult of Jagannatha itself integrates various aspects of 
Hinduism prevalent in Orissa, i.e. Vig1uism, Sivaism, Saktism and tribal 
or village cults and to some extent even aspects of Buddhism. The 
regional level of Orissa finds its expression in the concept of the "Five 
Deities" (pancadevatlis) which integrates the most important cults of 
Orissa, i.e. Siva-Lingariija of Bhubaneswar, Durga-Viraja of Jajpur, 
"L.E. B. Cobden-Ram~ay, Benpal Gaze/leers: Feudatory States of Orissa, Calcutta 
_1910; H . Kulke, ' ·Kshatriyaization and Social Change. A Study in Orissa Setting", 
m Aspects of Changing India: Studies in Honour of Professor <;hur>•e, $. Devadas 
Pillai ed, Bombay, 1976, pp. 398-409. 
10H Kulke, see F.N. 42. 
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Vi~9u-Jagannatha of Puri, Siirya of Konarak and Gaq.esa-Mahavinayaka 
at a place of the same name in North Orissa. Three of the pancadevatas 
had very distinct associations with ruling dynasties of Orissa: Viraja 
and Lingaraja were the tutelary deities of the Bhauma Karas and 
the Somavarpsis respectively, and Jagannatha, as mentioned before, of 
the Ganga dynasty. Surya was included because of the monumental sun 
temple of Konarak, built in about 1250. Ganesa is worshipped as 
Mahavinayaka in a flat unhewn stone in the sanctum sanctorum of a 
classical Hindu temple and represents the dominant tribal aspect of 
Orissa's religion among the pancadevatas. 
On the third, "sub-regional" level we find a group of very powerful 
indigenous goddesses, many of which have been the tutelary deities of 
the former feudatory states of Orissa. Most of them are still worshipped 
in aniconic idols which bear witness to their pre-brahmanic origin. The 
most important among them form a group of the " Eight Mothers" 
(a$(amiitrka). The link between these "Mothers" and the state deity is 
described symbolically through the picture of a great tent, Jagannatha 
being the tent pole and the Eight Mothers representing the tent's pegs. 
Below the~e "subregional" deities we find on the local level the 
village goddesses (gramadevata) . Clusters of local village deities are often 
associated with the nearby subregional deities , though their relations 
are less codified than the interrelations of the subregional and regional 
deities, 
Apart from their horizontal integration these four levels are linked 
vertically. too, inasmuch as Jagannatha as State Deity is also a member 
of the "Five Deities", and Viraja-Durga at Jajpur, who belongs to the 
same regional group, figures also prominently among the subregional 
"Eight Mothers". All these gods and goddesses of Orissa are further-
more interlinked in a very elaborate system of ritual relations which 
finds its expression in a very dense network of pilgrimage as a major 
factor of the cultural integration of various nuclear areas of Orissa into 
a cultural unity. 51 
All over India, the early centuries of the second milliennium A.O. 
(which coincide with the Co~a period from which Stein derives his 
conclusions) witnessed a period of intensive activities to compile local 
legends and traditions in works which became most important for the 
growth of the regional traditions. They were written dowri both in 
regional languages (e.g. the Periya Pura~1a,;, in Tamil) or in Sanskrit, as 
for instance m the Utkala Khai:iqam of' the Skanda Purii!Ja. Many of 
these Sanskrit ..collections of local Pura,.zas (Sthala-Purlu;ia) often became 
part of the great Skanda Pura1Ja or at least were termed as parts of it. 
These compilations were read out or recited by pilgrim guides, and on 
11J. Preston, "Sacred Centres and Symbolic Networks in India", paper presented 
at the Xth Int. Congress of Anthrop. and Ethn. Sciences, Delhi, 1978. 
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the occasion of local festivals. Furthermore it has been shown that they 
acted as an important means in the process of "Sanskritization" of 
tribes in the late medieval period.61 Generally speaking they had a 
tremendous influence on the development of the regional traditions 
which integrated-but certainly not eliminated-the traditions and 
legends of the local nuclear areas. 
IX 
At the end of these rather sketchy delineations we may arrive at the 
following conclusion~. The heuristic value of the concept of the segmen-
tary state for a structural analysis of medieval Hindu kingdoms is 
undeniable. However, two objections have been raised here against its 
unmodified application to Indian history as a whole. Firstly it puts 
emphasis on the distance between the "imperial" level from the local 
level through the concept of ritual sovereignty. Secondly, the various 
segments or units of the medieval Hindu kingdoms are isolated rather 
strictly. The regional traditions played an important role in our present 
discussion because of their vertically and horizontally integrating func-
tion. They bridged the gulf between the "high" and the "low", thus 
modifying the function of "ritual sovereignty" to "ritual policy". 
Horizontally, the regional traditions helped to integrate the segments 
of the regional kingdoms. The example of Orissa shows therefore !hat 
the structural development of medieval Hindu kingdoms should not 
be viewed only under the aspects of decentralization or fragmentation 
and segmentation but also under the aspect of integration. 
Of course it would be wrong to assume that the Gajapati kings of 
Orissa had been able to achieve anything like a unitary state with clearly 
defined territorial s wereignty, centralized government, specialized 
administrativ,e staff and the monopoly of power. But if we survey the 
historical development of Orissa during the millennium between the 6th 
and the 16th centuries, we find that its main characteristics are a process 
of continuous though imperfect integration rather than fragmentation 
and segmentation. Although Orissa, as any other Hindu kingdom, did 
not reach the stage of a unitary state and certainly retained many 
characteristics of a segmentary state, its units were fused, obliterating 
other traits of a segmentary state as depicted by B. Stein. 
In the context of medieval Indian history we will most probably have 
to realize very soon that it is futile to operate with one structural model 
only. Further research will have to distinguish between different regions 
and periods. Northern India after the downfall of the empires of the 
Guptas and the Gurjara-Pratiharas for instance may offer a more 
suitable field for studies of an alleged Indian feudalism, whereas Tamil 
11Surajit Sinha, '''Vaisnava Influence on a Tribal Culture" in Krishna, Myth, 
Rites and Attitudes, Milton Singer ed., Honolulu 1966, p. 72 f. ' 
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Nadu with its strong tradition of the niiefus is certainly more suitable for 
the study of the segmentary state-if one is willing to modify the con-
cepts accordingly. Orissa seems to provide an example for another still 
"unbaptized" model where regional integration in its broadest sense 
was fo.r several centuries the main feature of political development. 
Only after analysing the regional varieties of the structural development 
we should aim at an inductive and general concept of the structure of 
Hindu kingdoms. This concept will have to include modes of integra-
tion as an important aspect of state formation in early and medieval 
India which hitherto have been neglected in the discussions about Indian 
feudalism and the concept of the segmentary state in South Indian 
history.$3 
11 Postscript: 
After his visit to Heidelberg on 11.6.80 Prof. Burton Stein sent me elaborate and in 
several points very revealing comments on this paper. As they are of great impor-
tance for further research I would like to quote a few passages from it: "My view is 
that the linkages among shrines in South India in which bhakti worship is practised 
(and this does not mean all shrines) had the effect in South India of enhancing or 
raising the salvational credentials of local (and I would call them, segmentary-linked) 
shrines with respect to .those great shrines to which they are linked. The arguments 
on this question are made in the volume of essays I edited on south Indian Temples 
[see F.N. 36). I accept your point about the regionalization of bhakti traditions, but 
insist that the cultic concomitant of this was to strengthen segmental shrines . 
. . [Regarding] the matter of political implication' ... I reiterate that I see the local 
level not as passive before royal pressures to control, but seeking such links (not of 
political but ritual subordination) for purposes of local rule. As we discussed at the 
seminar [at Heidelberg], I reject the idea of ritual 'as a weak substitute' and do see it 
as a genuine political means, as you put it. Do we really differ here? A similar 
kin<1 of disagreement, which may be a false one, is on the matter of integration 
versus segmentation (or fragmentation as the title puts it). I contend that the seg. 
State formulation is precisely about integration, given segmentation. It may be a 
matter of where, in particular analyses, emphasis is placed, and there your treatment 
of Orissa with its very pronounced topographical discontinuities stresses the means of 
overcoming this: the point is that the saliency of integration seems to arise from 
social and topographical segmentation. It is not one or the other, but the interaction 
of essentially segmentary and integrating forces in the societies. In Orissa, as you 
point out, there is the additional difference from my South India in the standing of 
tribes in the society ef each area. In all this I do not want to be understood as 
dismissing the issue of integration/segmentation; it may be of great importance which 
idiom dominates in the evidence which we use (and it is different), but I contend that 
the underlying typical problem may be the same... Finally, 'integration' is always a 
key factor, the problematic of these systems in the sense of a task with these societies 
and a method/theory within analysis because the segmentary state only exists as its 
constituent parts recognize a ritual centcr, a king, and by which recognition advance 
and strengthen the segmental parts. Thus I consider your title mistakes the case: it is 
not segmentation versus integration, but segmentation and integration." 
(B. Stein, periOnal communication of June 20th, 1980). 
